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Abstract
In spite of the potential benefits of board IT governance and the costs of ineffective oversight, there has been
little field-based research in this area and an inadequate application of theory. Drawing upon strategic choice
and institutional theories, we propose a theoretical model that seeks to explain the antecedents of board IT
governance and its consequences. Survey responses from 188 corporate directors across Canada indicate that
both board attributes and organizational factors influence board involvement in IT governance. The results
suggest that proportion of insiders, board size, IT competency, organizational age, and role of IT influence the
board’s level of involvement in IT governance. The responses also indicate that board IT governance has a
positive impact on the contribution of IT to organizational performance. Overall, the results support the
integration of strategic choice and institutional theories to explain the antecedents to board IT governance
and its consequences, as together they provide a more holistic framework with which to view board IT
governance.
Keywords: IT Governance, Board of Directors, Corporate Governance, Strategic Choice Theory, Institutional
Theory, Contribution of IT to Organizational Performance.
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1. Introduction
The practioner and academic literature has paid increased attention to the practice of information
technology (IT) governance by boards of directors. However, it seems that many corporate boards do
not explicitly practice a formalized style of IT governance, and of those that do, many face significant
challenges. The potential impact of ineffective IT governance is clear, with organizations spending an
increasing amount on IT, with a median level of spending on IT hitting 1.8 percent of revenues for
organizations in the US (Computer Economics, 2010), and a large percentage of these IT
investments failing to deliver their intended return. Recently, studies have suggested the need for
effective board-level IT governance in order to realize value from IT (e.g., Andriole, 2009; Buckby,
Best, & Stewart, 2005; IT Governance Institute, 2003; Nolan & McFarlan, 2005; Trites, 2004).
In spite of the increased recognition of the potential benefits of board IT governance in the literature and
the well known issues with IT failures, there appears to have been little field-based research conducted
in this area, and little application of theory to examine board IT governance. Specifically, the relationship
between board IT governance and IT value has not been empirically evaluated. Drawing upon two
complementary perspectives – strategic choice and institutional theories – we propose a theoretical
model that seeks to explain the antecedents of board IT governance and its consequences.
The theoretical model has three premises. First, based upon strategic choice theory, we suggest that
board attributes – proportion of insiders, size, and IT competency of directors – reflect the potential level
of IT strategic judgment of a board, and also influence a board’s potential involvement in IT governance.
Second, we suggest that it is insufficient to simply examine the influence of individual board member
attributes on board IT governance, because this approach does not consider institutional pressures.
Therefore, based upon institutional theory, we propose that organizational characteristics – size, age,
and role of IT – also influence a board’s involvement in IT governance. Third, based upon the argument
from strategic choice theory that organizational strategy impacts firm performance,and that board
involvement improves organizational strategy, we propose that the extent to which IT contributes to firm
performance is a function of the level of board involvement in IT governance.
To explore the proposed model, we first conducted interviews with corporate directors to examine the
theoretical premises, and used the interview results to develop the survey instrument. We then
executed an online survey to explore the model across a larger number of boards.
We first define board IT governance and discuss the characteristics of IT that distinguish it from
boards’ other governance responsibilities. We then overview the applicable IT governance literature
with a focus on the role of the board in IT governance and highlighting the gap between practice and
theory. Next, we describe, in general, strategic choice and institutional theories, and follow with the
research model and propositions. We then present the methodology, which includes the data
collection process, the development of measures and the validation process, and the examination of
the model using multiple regression. Finally, we discuss the findings and propose the contributions of
the research.

2. Board IT Governance Defined
According to a number of researchers, there remains limited understanding of the role of the board in
IT governance (e.g., De Haes & Van Grembergen, 2005; Huff, Maher, & Munro, 2006; Jordan &
Musson, 2004; Trites, 2004). The situation is confounded by the lack of one generally accepted
definition for IT governance (De Haes & Van Grembergen, 2005; Simonsson & Johnson, 2005). Van
Grembergen and De Haes (2009) present one of the most recent definitions:
Enterprise governance of IT is an integral part of enterprise governance and addresses
the definition and implementation of processes, structures and relational mechanisms in
the organization that enable both business and IT people to execute their responsibilities
in support of business/IT alignment and the creation of business value.
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This research adopts one of the most widely cited definitions:
IT governance is the responsibility of the board of directors and executive management. It is
an integral part of enterprise governance and consists of the leadership and organizational
structures and processes that ensure that the organization’s IT sustains and extends the
organization’s strategies and objectives (IT Government Institute, 2003, p.10).
These definitions are similar in terms of substance; however, we adopt the definition of the IT
Governance Institute because this definition specifically delineates IT governance as a responsibility
of both the board of directors and executive management. This is important because most IT
governance research has not focused on how the board is involved and has instead focused on
executive management’s use of organizational structures and the contingences that influence the
choice of structure (Brown & Grant, 2005). There is an important distinction between IT governance
and IT management – IT governance is the responsibility of the board, and the implementation of IT
governance mechanisms in the organization is the responsibility of executive management, as a part
of IT management. This distinction can impact research agendas and the use of research results.

3. Corporate Governance vs. IT Governance
Most regard the key role of the board as the separation of oversight from management decision
making, thus assuring stakeholders that the organization is using its resources as intended.
There are many empirical studies on the antecedents and consequences of board involvement in
corporate governance (e.g., refer to LeBlanc, 2003, and Appendix B for an extensive summary of the
literature); however, it is not sufficient to assume that these are the same for IT governance because
of the differences between IT and other areas of an organization traditionally governed by the board.
In particular, the pervasiveness, complexity, and rapidly changing nature of IT have changed the
knowledge and experience required to govern an organization (Weill & Ross, 2004). Furthermore, IT
may also require domain-specific knowledge and experience required for its governance and for
understanding the impact of IT on the business operational and strategic goals. Thus, the inherent
differences between IT and traditional areas of corporate governance suggest the need to better
understand board IT governance.

4. Literature Review – IT Governance
The overall scope of IT governance is situated at multiple layers in the organization – at the
management level, and at the strategic level where the board is involved (De Haes & Van
Grembergen, 2008b). Accordingly, as shown in Figure 1, the IT governance literature can be
classified into two separate streams. The first focuses on the design of decision-making structures at
the managerial level, while the second focuses on the role of the board.
The first stream – which focuses on the design of decision-making structures at the managerial level
– appears to be the predominant line of research in the literature. In a general review of IT
governance (Brown & Grant, 2005), we identified three categories focusing on the design of decisionmaking structures of IT governance: (1) IT organizational structures (centralized vs. decentralized and
horizontal vs. vertical); (2) contingencies of these IT governance structures; and (3) Weill and Ross’
IT governance framework (2004), which is an extension of the other two categories.
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Figure 1. Review of IT Governance Literature
The second stream of research – focusing on the role of the board in IT governance – can be
classified as either normative or descriptive. The normative literature (Buckby et al., 2005; Nolan &
McFarlan, 2005; IT Government Institute, 2003; Trites, 2004) advocates the importance of the board’s
role in IT governance, while the descriptive literature studies how boards are actually governing IT
(refer to Table 1).
Table 1. Summary of Descriptive Studies of the Board’s Role in IT Governance
Research
Question
Jordan and
Musson
(2004)

How are boards
dealing with IT Interview
governance?

Can IT
governance be
De Haes and deployed using
Van
a mixture of
Grembergen structures,
(2005)
processes, and
relational
mechanisms?

Huff et al.
(2006)

Data
Collection

Interview,
review of
reports

How are boards
dealing with IT Interview
governance?

Sample

Findings

13 board members
(with positions on 60
boards).

Knowledge of IT poor
Limited experience in e-commerce
e-commerce ventures primarily reviewed
and implemented by consultants, not the
board.

1 organization
(Belgian Financial
Group)
Interviewed IT and
business managers,
CIO, IT governance
project manager,
member of the board,
executive committee.

Executive Committee reports to the board
monthly on major events and projects
IT Strategy Committee consists of three
board members; however, it “did not enable
a more thorough and ongoing involvement
of boards in IT governance” (p. 5).
The “Board works at a very high, strategic
level and they are consequently not the
steering power for IT or IT governance”
(p. 5).

17 board chairs,
board members and
17 CIOs in the same
medium to large
companies
(half financial
services and half
primary resources).

IT attention deficit in boards
CIOs think that boards should pay more
attention.
Boards pay attention to IT Risk.
Half of financial service firms and no primary
resources companies pay attention to other
IT governance topics.
None of the companies have board-level
committees.
CIOs do not support board-level
committees.
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Table 1. Summary of Descriptive Studies of the Board’s Role in IT Governance (cont.)
Research
Question
Deloitte
Consulting
LLP and
Is the board
Corporate
involved in IT
Board Member Strategies?
Magazine
(2006)

Data
Collection

Survey

Sample

Findings

455 directors at
$1B public
companies
worldwide (out of
10,000 surveys).

Overall think IT strategy and implementation
is important to the success of the company
13.8% of boards completely and actively
involved in IT.
66.5% think IT should be discussed at the
board level.
56.4% of boards have 3 or more members
knowledgeable in IT (only 8% of boards
have no members with IT knowledge).

More than 50
CIOs and CTOs.

Boards do not participate nearly enough in
major technology decisions, are out of the
loop on technology issues, and are missing
opportunities to optimize operational and
strategic technology investments.

Andriole
(2009)

Do boards of
directors govern
IT?

Survey

Parent and
Reich (2009)

How can boards
of directors
govern IT risk?

Suggest areas that should be considered by
directors to govern IT risk such as
Interviews,
17 interviews at 6
ITcompliance risk, infrastructure risk, project
review of
firms.
risk, business continuity risk, and
reports
information risk.

Bart and Turel
(2010)

The extent to
which the IT
governance
questions
proposed by the
CICA were being
used in practice.

Survey

94 Directors.

Board members ask only about
44.4% of the 27 CICA IT board governance
questions.
Suggested that board members may simply
not be paying sufficient attention to the
governance of IT in their organizations due
to lack of knowledge or education.

As Table 1 shows, a review of the descriptive literature revealed very few studies concentrating on how
the board is actually involved in IT governance. Although the number of studies is relatively small, the
consensus is that boards are not fulfilling their IT governance duties effectively. The studies imply that a
gap exists between the normative and descriptive research, with the board’s involvement in IT
governance in practice falling well short of the level of involvement proposed in the literature. In addition,
the review of the literature did not find any empirical studies examining the antecedents or
consequences of board IT governance.

5. Theoretical Background
We have focused on the institutional and strategic choice perspectives as a way of theorizing about
board IT governance. The theories operate under different, partially-overlapping theoretical
assumptions, and thus, each theory gives a limited explanation of the whole phenomenon of the
antecedents to board IT governance and its consequences. Together, they provide a more holistic
framework with which to view board IT governance.

5.1. Strategic Choice Theory
Strategic choice theorists focus on organizational actors and the role that they play in organizational
change, instead of focusing solely on change as a passive environmental selection process, which is
the focus of institutional theory (Child, 1997). Strategic choice theorists propose that structural
determinism (i.e., institutional theory) is inadequate because it ignores the influence that leaders of
organizations may have on the design and structure of organizations.

5.2. Institutional Theory
Institutional theorists emphasize “environmental norms and the weight of firm history as explanations
of organizational actions” (Judge & Zeithaml, 1992, p. 769). Institutional theorists, thus, view
585
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organizational behavior as “the product of ideas, values and beliefs” – institutional pressures – and
propose that “organizational behaviors are responses to not only market pressures but to institutional
pressures” (Greenwood & Hinnings, 1996, p. 1025).

5.3. Integration of Theories
We propose that strategic choice and institutional theories offer complementary views of why
boards decide to become involved in the governance of IT. Proponents of these theories have
noted the need to apply both theories together to understand organizational behavior and that one
of these theories – either a purely deterministic or non-deterministic perspective – would be
insufficient for explaining organizational behavior (e.g., Hitt & Tyler, 1991; Oliver, 1991). “The major
criticisms of institutional theory have been its assumptions of organizational passivity and its failure
to address strategic behavior and the exercise of influence in its conceptions of institutionalization”
(Oliver, 1991, p. 173). Furthermore, strategic choice theory has evolved from its original conception
of decision-makers’ choice to extend to the environment within which the organization is operating,
thus, viewing organizational structure and design as a factor of both characteristics of decisionmakers’ and environmental conditions.
Institutional and strategic choice theories have primarily been applied in the context of
organizational structures. We found one study that applied these theories together in the context of
corporate governance (Judge & Zeithaml, 1992). According to Judge and Zeithaml (1992), a
board’s response to an environment depends on the institutional pressures an organization faces
and the strategic judgment of top management. Strategic choice theory also offers a view of the
consequences of board IT governance. This theory has been applied in the context of the
performance outcomes associated with corporate governance (Judge & Zeithaml, 1992); however,
our review of the literature did not find any studies that directly applied this theory to examine the
performance outcomes of board IT governance.

6. Theoretical Model and Propositions
In the next few sections, this paper discusses the theoretical model and propositions, which Table
2shows. The model proposes how the exercise of strategic choice and institutional forces impact the
antecedents and consequences of board IT governance.

Figure 2. Theoretical Model: Antecedents and Consequences of Board IT Governance
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7. Antecedents to Board IT Governance
7.1. Board Attributes and Board IT Governance
As noted above, the model uses strategic choice theory to propose relationships between board
attributes and board IT governance. Although prior research has not applied this theory to IT
governance, strategic choice theory would suggest that board composition may influence the boards’
fulfillment of different roles.
Board attributes refer to characteristics of the board: the proportion of insiders to outsiders, board
size, and the IT competency of directors. We discuss each of these characteristics and the proposed
relationship with board IT governance in turn.
We refer to inside directors as those members of the board who are employed as part of the
organization’s management team, their subordinates, relatives, or managers of the organization’s
subsidiaries. Also, these directors could be members of the organization’s immediate past
management team (Cochrane, Wood, & Jones, 1985).
The proportion of inside directors appears to have been one of the most commonly studied variables
in the corporate governance literature. There has been increasing pressure for boards to decrease
their proportion of insiders based on the idea that the interests of insiders are aligned with those of
management, while those of outsiders are aligned with stockholders. Thus, whereas insiders may be
more likely to pursue strategies consistent with maximizing the size and diversity of the firm, outsiders
may be more likely to pursue strategies consistent with maximizing the long-run profitability of the firm
(Hill & Snell, 1988). Extensive prior research finds evidence consistent with this argument (see
Hermalin & Weisbach, 2003). However, many boards still have inside directors with, on average,
inside directors making up 25 percent of board membership (University of Southern California Center
for Effective Organizations and Heidrick & Struggles, 2007). In fact, there is some empirical and
theoretical research supporting the desirability of inside directors on boards (e.g., Klein, 1998; Bhagat
& Black, 2002; Hermalin & Weisbach, 1988; Mace, 1986).
These studies focus on the proportion of insiders as proxies for board processes, and the relationship
between these proxies and some other measure, such as financial performance, instead of directly
examining the relationship between proportion of insiders and governance involvement. We found
three studies that explore the construct of board involvement directly in empirical studies and
examine the relationship between proportion of insiders and governance. However, these studies
yield mixed results. For example, Judge and Zeithaml (1992) and Baack (2000) find a negative
relationship between insider representation and board involvement. Whereas Westphal (1999) find
that insiders can increase board involvement by raising the frequency of advice and counsel
interactions between CEOs and outside directors.
It remains unclear what impact the proportion of insiders has on board involvement in governance.
However, using strategic choice theory as the lens through which to study this relationship draws
attention to the relevance of information for the exercise of strategic choice and points to the
necessity of securing relevant information that is not ambiguous. We propose that insiders have
relevant knowledge of IT and business activities that allow them to notify the board about
organizational issues that necessitate board IT governance. Therefore, we propose that:
Proposition 1: Insider representation is positively related to board IT governance.
Board size is another of the most commonly studied variables in the corporate governance
literature. While board size has been the subject of extensive research, we only found one study in
the literature that directly studies the relationship between board size and board involvement in
corporate governance. In that study, Judge and Zeithaml (1992) find a negative relationship
between these variables.
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Strategic choice theory focuses on management’s perceptions of environmental conditions and its
ability to make decisions that cope with those conditions (Miles & Snow, 1978). Therefore, with
respect to IT governance, strategic choice theory would suggest that the degree and type of board
involvement will depend on the ability of the board to work together to effectively debate and discuss
the organization’s IT. Therefore, we propose that:
Proposition 2: Board size is negatively related to board IT governance.
This research defines IT competency as the extent to which a board has IT expertise and uses IT
governance mechanisms to govern IT. It is suggested that, while IT expertise and IT governance
mechanisms are separate, both are required for IT competency.
Expertise refers to “the characteristics, skills, and knowledge that distinguish experts from novices
and less experienced people” (Ericsson, 2006). Previous studies of boards’ IT governance have
suggested that boards may be falling short in their IT governance responsibilities because of an IT
knowledge deficit (Bart & Turel, 2010; Huff et al., 2006).
The second component of board IT competency is IT governance mechanisms. It is suggested that IT
governance mechanisms increase the capacity of the board to acquire, interpret, and disseminate
information, thus, increasing the ability of the board to govern IT. At the managerial level, it has been
suggested that IT governance can be enacted using a variety of IT governance mechanisms –
structures, processes, and relational mechanisms (e.g., De Haes & Van Grembergen, 2005, 2008a;
Peterson, 2003; Weil & Ross, 2004). Table 2 outlines examples of IT governance mechanisms.
Table 2. IT Governance Mechanisms

1

Structures

Roles and responsibilities, IT organization structure, CIO on Board, IT
strategy committee, IT steering committee

Processes

Strategic Information Systems Planning, Balanced (IT) Scorecards,
Information Economics, Service Level Agreements, COBIT and ITIL, IT
alignment / governance maturity models

Relational
Mechanisms

Active participation and collaboration between principle stakeholders,
Partnership rewards and incentives, Business/IT co-location, Cross-functional
business/IT training and rotation

There have been a number of IT governance mechanisms recommended for the board, including:
forming an IT Strategy Committee, engaging outside experts, reviewing and critiquing IT strategy
projects and IT security practices, holding sessions with the CFO, and holding executive sessions
with committee members (IT Governance Institute, 2003; Nolan & McFarlan, 2005).
In this study, we examined how director IT competency, including IT expertise and IT governance
mechanisms, influence IT governance. According to strategic choice theory, external constraints
(environmental determinism) are insufficient for explaining decision-makers’ capacities for exercising
choice, and one must also consider the characteristics of the decision-maker (action determinism),
because predetermined mind-sets could limit the range of strategic choices recognized and
considered by decision-makers (Whittington, 1988). In summary, board decisions are strategic in
nature, and when faced with such decisions, decision-makers typically perceive only selected
alternatives and adopt a simplified model of the situation that is largely shaped by their prior
knowledge and experience (Geletkanycz & Hambrick, 1997). This research suggests that IT
governance mechanisms increase information sources, thereby enabling directors to obtain more IT
information both inside and outside of the organization, and thus, increase the board’s capacity to
govern IT. Therefore, we propose that:
Proposition 3: IT competency is positively related to board IT governance.
1

Adapted from Peterson (2003).
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8. Organization Factors and Board IT Governance
This research uses institutional theory to propose relationships between organizational factors and
board IT governance (Figure 2).
While we have not found any studies using institutional theory to examine IT governance at the board
level, we did find two studies that use institutional theory to examine IT governance at the
2
organizational level . These studies argue that removing the assumption of rationality (followed by
much of the research) and using institutional theory as a new lens through which to view different IT
governance modes has the potential to offer new insights into understanding the drivers of
governance. Jacobson (2009) suggests that ”Examining institutional pressures and context can
illuminate how IT governance is actually done. A much more dynamic picture is likely to emerge of IT
governance in a context that both enables and constrains action”. Similarly, Boubaker and Nyrhinen
(2008) propose that institutional pressures play a role in determining the IT governance mode.
We propose that, in addition to rational pressures, institutional factors – referred to in this study as
organizational factors – have an influence on board involvement in IT governance. Organizational
factors refer to the size of the organization, the age of the organization, and the role of IT in the
organization. We discuss each of these factors in turn.
The relationship between organization size and board involvement does not appear to have been
studied with respect to IT governance; however, it has been studied with respect to corporate
governance (e.g., Baack, 2000; Judge & Zeithaml, 1992). Judge and Zeithaml (1992) examine the
relationship between the structural differentiation of organizations and board involvement in corporate
governance. This is relevant because larger organization size has been suggested to be associated
with increased structural differentiation (Blau, 1970). Judge and Zeithaml (1992) find that increased
differentiation is negatively associated with board involvement. They use institutional theory to explain
the relationship between differentiation and board involvement and suggest that “an organization’s
level of diversification will be negatively associated with board involvement because isomorphic
pressures should be more diffuse for diversified firms than for non-diversified ones” (Judge &
Zeithaml, 1992, p. 773). This research uses organization size as a proxy for level of differentiation,
and, thus, views larger organizations as more differentiated. Therefore, we propose that:
Proposition 4: Organization size is negatively related to board IT governance.
It has been suggested that organizational processes reflect the practices at the time of founding
because the organization adopts the predominant practices in that time. Furthermore, since
organizational processes change slowly, many of the practices remain unchanged from the time of
organization founding (Eisenhardt, 1988; Stinchcombe, 1965; Tolbert & Zucker, 1983).
Stinchcombe (1965) first discusses this concept. He suggests that “the organizational inventions
that can be made at a particular time in history depend on the social technology available at the
time” (p. 153). He finds that organizations that were formed at one time typically have a different
social structure from those formed at another time. More recent studies have also found a
relationship between time of founding and organization structure (e.g., Eisenhardt, 1988; Tolbert &
Zucker, 1983). According to this view, board activities, and thus, board IT governance, reflect a
pattern of doing things that evolve over time and become legitimated within the board and the
organization. Board activities are then resistant to change even in the face of major changes in the
organization, such as the emergence of the strategic importance of IT. This research proposes that
the institutional perspective holds and a board’s current practices reflect those at the time of
founding. Therefore, we propose that:
Proposition 5: Organization age is negatively related to board IT governance.
The normative IT governance literature recommends a view of board involvement contingent on
characteristics of the organization and its use of, and dependence on, IT (IT Governance Institute,
2
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2003; Nolan & McFarlan, 2005). In a recent survey of directors, Bart and Turel (2010) find tentative
support for the possibility of such a contingency-based view of IT governance based on the role of IT
in the organization. Since institutional theory would suggest that industry norms influence
organizational processes through isomorphism (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983), and organizations with a
high reliance on IT would likely be operating in an industry that also relies highly on IT, the industry
norm would likely be higher board involvement in IT governance. Therefore, we propose that:
Proposition 6: Overall role of IT in the organization is positively related to board IT
governance.

9. Consequences of Board IT Governance
As Figure 2 shows, we use strategic choice theory to develop Proposition 7 regarding the relationship
between board IT governance and the contribution of IT to firm performance.
It has been argued that the management of IT, not just the quantitative investment in IT, can impact
performance (Mata, Fuerst, & Barney, 1995; Byrd & Turner, 2001; Chatterjee, Richardson, & Zmud,
2001). There is empirical evidence showing that the quality of the IT department can impact firm
performance (Bharadwaj, 2000; Byrd & Turner, 2001; Santhanam & Hartono, 2003) and that CIO
strategic decision-making authority influences the contribution of IT to firm performance (Preston,
Chen, & Leidner, 2008). Based on this research and strategic choice theory, we theoretically derive
the argument that the extent to which IT contributes to firm performance is a function of the level of
the board’s involvement in IT governance. We did not find an empirical study directly examining the
consequences of board IT governance during the literature review; however, evidence from a recent
study on the relationship between proxies for board IT governance and firm performance suggests
that a positive relationship exists (Boritz & Lim, 2007). In fact, there is empirical support for a positive
relationship between board involvement in corporate governance and financial performance (Judge &
Zeithaml, 1992) and between proxies for board involvement in governance and firm performance
(refer to Zahra and Pearce, 1989, for a review).
According to strategic choice theory, organizational strategy and its processes affect firm
performance (Miles & Snow, 1978). It has been argued that increased board involvement improves
organizational strategy and its processes by “forcing managers to check their assumptions and do
their homework before advancing strategic proposals”, and by “helping to challenge narrow thinking,
escalating commitment, and weak analysis” (Judge & Zeithaml, 1992, p. 775). In fact, boards have
the latitude to promote and provide oversight of strategic proposals, including IT proposals, that add
value to the organization. Furthermore, there is some research indicating that when boards provide
richer information, management is more likely to engage in behaviors that are consistent with
stockholders interests (Richardson, 2000). Therefore, we propose that:
Proposition 7: Board IT governance is positively related to the contribution of IT to firm
performance.

10. Methodology
To test the model, we conducted interviews and a survey. Since the model comprises measured and
latent variables, we first conducted exploratory factor analysis (EFA) on the latent variables to
3
analyze the sets of items that measure those constructs . Next, we used ordinary least squares
multiple regression to analyze the results. Each of these procedures is reported below.

10.1 Data Collection
We first conducted 10 in-depth interviews with corporate directors to probe how they govern IT, what
influences their involvement in IT governance, and what have been the performance consequences.
The 10 directors interviewed were on a total of 47 boards, with each director on an average of five
3

EFA is useful for data reduction by condensing the information contained in a number of original variables into a smaller set of
new, composite dimensions, with a minimum loss of information (Hair, Anderson, Tatham, & Black, 1998). EFA based on the
Maximum Likelihood Extraction method, combined with varimax rotation was used for each of the latent variables.
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boards. The boards were from a variety of industry sectors, with banks, savings, and other financial
institutions representing the largest proportion of the sample. Additionally, the directors interviewed
had an average of 13 years’ experience on boards, and most, seven out of the 10, identified
themselves as having no prior experience working in an IT role or in the management of IT in an
organization. Each interview took an average of 75 minutes to complete and consisted of an in-depth
discussion of one IT governance decision and/or incident with which the director was involved while
serving on a board, and a semi-structured questionnaire to discuss IT governance on all of the boards
of which the director was a member.
We used the results from the interviews, combined with findings in the literature, to create a survey
to assess broad relationships between the antecedents and consequences of board IT governance.
We paid specific attention to the interviews to develop measures for the constructs where
measures have not been developed in past literature, namely board IT governance and IT
competency. We used the transcribed interviews to augment the questions for the IT governance
and IT competency constructs in the survey. The intention was to ensure that the components of
board IT governance and IT competency provide an adequate coverage of the constructs. The
interview phase provided some preliminary evidence to justify the next phase of research –
investigating the propositions in a more quantitative fashion.
4

We pre-tested the survey and redesigned it to address the comments of the pre-test participants .
We then administered an electronic survey to the approximately 3,200 members of the Institute for
Corporate Directors (ICD), and received 193 responses. It is difficult to determine the response rate
because the survey was limited to respondents who were currently serving on a board of directors
(self-identifying). The ICD’s Director of Communication indicated that 83 percent of the members
classify themselves as a director; however this does not necessarily mean that a member is currently
serving on a board. Therefore, a conservative estimate of the response rate would be 7 percent (193
out of 2,656 members – 83 percent of 3,200 members). However, it is likely that the response rate is
higher, as not all of the 2,656 members that classify themselves as directors were currently serving
on a board. A survey of directors on IT governance in the professional literature reported a response
rate of 0.046 percent (Deloitte Consulting LLP and Corporate Board Member Magazine, 2006).
Appendix A provides an overview of the general characteristics of the 188 responses to our survey
5
that were included in the final analysis . Due to lack of information on non-respondents, it was not
possible to test if the responding group differed from the non-respondents.
Since directors often serve on more than one board, they were asked to respond for the board of the
largest organization they served. The responses were from many different industries, with no industry
representing more than 11.2 percent of the sample. The largest percentages of respondents were
from energy/utilities (11.2 percent), other service company (10.1 percent), other financial services
companies (7.4 percent), insurance (6.9 percent), and advanced technology (6.4 percent). In addition,
no one ownership type dominated the responses. Ownership of the organizations was almost evenly
divided among non-profit (27.7 percent), privately (30.9 percent) and publicly (27.7 percent) held
companies, with the rest of the responses from governmental organizations (13.3 percent).
We also asked the respondents to identify some information about themselves. We first asked
respondents to identify their current role(s) on the board. Please note that the total percent is greater
than 100 because respondents were able to select multiple roles on the board. Notably, 46.3 percent
of the respondents indicated that they were outside directors. This reflects guidelines in the literature
that recommend that board composition consist of a large proportion of outside directors. In addition,
4

5
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Pre-testing of the survey was conducted with two corporate directors, two leading researchers in IT governance, and an expert in
survey design. During the pre-test, participants were asked to respond to the survey questions and give feedback on any of the
items and any other issues they wished to share. The pre-test revealed comments on the survey layout, wording of the questions,
and length of the survey.
Of the 193 responses to the survey, four responses were omitted because they contained few or no answers to the survey
questions. One additional response was deleted because multiple regression of board attributes and organization factors on
board involvement in IT governance revealed that the response was an influential outlier. Multiple regression is highly sensitive to
such responses, as they can overstate the coefficient of determination, give erroneous values for the slope and intercept, and
lead to false conclusions about the model.
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only 0.5 percent and 2.1 percent were CTOs and CIOs, respectively. This reflects the small
proportion of CTOs and CIOs that sit on boards (e.g., Burson-Marsteller, 2005).
It seems reasonable to assume that most of the respondents were familiar with their board’s
approach to governance because 78.4 percent of the respondents had served for more than two
years on the board for which they were answering the survey. Most of the respondents identified
themselves as having little or no experience working directly in IT (less than two years) (66.8
percent). This relatively low level of director experience in IT roles is indicative of what has been
found in previous studies (e.g., Burson-Marsteller, 2005; Huff et al., 2006). Finally, the respondents
were split between those who had no or less than two years experience in the general management
of IT (48.4 percent) and those who had two or greater years of this type of experience (51.6 percent).

10.2. Measures
The measures were derived from a combination of prior work, the IT governance literature, this
study’s theoretical model, and our interview findings. The definitions of the constructs and their
corresponding references are in Table 3. Refer to Appendix B for the survey questions for the
measured variables and for a list of the items for each construct resulting from EFA.
Table 3. Constructs and Items in Theoretical Model

Board Attributes

Board IT Governance

Construct

Translation of Construct
to Items

Theoretical References

Adapted from Nolan and McFarlan’s
contingency model of board IT
governance (2005), and guided by results
of this study’s interviews with directors,
EFA extracted one factor for
and studies in the literature that directly
board IT governance.
measure the construct of board
involvement in empirical studies (Judge &
Zeithaml, 1992; Johnson, Hoskisson, &
Hitt 1993; Westphal, 1999; Baack, 2000).

Board IT
Governance

The degree to
which the board
is involved in IT
governance
activities.

Proportion of
6
Insiders

Number of inside
directors divided
by the total
number of
directors on the
board.

Common measure from the literature
(see Johnson et al., 1993).

Total number of
directors.

Common measure from the literature
(see Johnson et al., 1993).

Board size

6

IT
Competency

6

Definition of
Construct

Extent to which a
board has IT
expertise and
uses IT
governance
mechanisms to
govern IT.

EFA extracted:
(1) A three-factor model for
IT expertise – internal
knowledge, external
information, and experience
and training.
(2) A two-factor model for IT
governance mechanisms internal activities, and
external activities.

(1) IT expertise scales adapted from
Basellier, Benbasat, and Reich (2003)
(2) IT governance mechanisms adapted
from the literature (e.g., De Haes & Van
Grembergen, 2005, 2008a, 2008b; IT
Governance Institute, 2003; Nolan &
McFarlan, 2005; Peterson, 2003; Weil &
Ross, 2004)

The proportion of insider and board size variables were transformed by taking their natural log. This logarithmic transformation
was performed to adjust for the nonlinearity between the dependent and independent variables and, thus, to ensure that the
regression of assumption of linearity was not violated.
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Table 3. Constructs and Items in Theoretical Model (cont.)

Organization Factors

Construct

Theoretical
References

Translation of Construct to Items

Organization
Size

The number of
employees in the
organization.

Common measure from
the literature (see
Judge & Zeithaml,
1992).

Organization
Age

Number of years since
the organization was
founded.

Common measure from
the literature (see
Judge & Zeithaml,
1992).

Role of IT

IT Contribution to Firm Performance

Definition of Construct

IT Contribution
to Firm
Performance 7

The degree to which the
organization has
strategic or operational
reliance on IT.

Self-report of the degree
to which IT contributes
to: return on investment
(ROI), sales revenue
increase, market share
increase, cost savings,
operating efficiency,
process improvement,
and customer
satisfaction.

EFA extracted factors that are
consistent with those proposed by
Raghunathan et al. (1999). EFA
Raghunathan,
extracted:
(1) A three-factor model for strategic Raghunathan, and Tu
reliance on IT - managerial support,
(1999)
differentiation, and enhancement.
(2) A one-factor model for operational
reliance on IT.

EFA extracted two-factors: (1)
external performance metrics
(consisting of sales revenue
increase, market share increase,
customer satisfaction, ROI), and (2)
internal performance metrics
(consisting of process improvement,
operating efficiency, and cost
8
savings) .

Preston et al. (2008)

The measured variables – proportion of insiders, board size, organization size, and organization age
– are based on common measures in the literature (see Table 3) and require little comment; however,
further discussion of the latent variables follows. EFA indicated that there was strong convergent and
discriminatory validity in the data with the items included in each scale having moderate to very high
factor loadings (all above 0.537). This indicated that the scales were measuring the intended
concepts. In addition, reliability analysis (Cronbach’s alpha) tended to indicate excellent reliability
(0.692 to 0.943), thus suggesting that the items in each scale reflected the same construct.

10.3. Board IT Governance
We reviewed the more general corporate governance literature to provide insight on how to measure
board involvement in governance. Interestingly, prior research has seldom directly examined how
7

8
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Examination of the survey data revealed that there was a large percentage of answers of “not applicable” for the operational
performance variables for non-profit and government organizations. Therefore, these organizations were eliminated from this
analysis and only privately held and publicly traded organizations were included (comprising 110 responses) in the analysis of the
consequences of board IT governance.
Since multiple regression requires one dependent variable, an overall operational performance measure was computed by
summing the standardized scales of the external and internal performance dimensions.
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boards conduct corporate governance. We found four studies that have explored the construct of
board involvement in corporate governance directly in empirical studies (Judge & Zeithaml, 1992;
Johnson et al., 1993; Westphal, 1999; Baack, 2000). Building upon these studies and guided by the
interviews we conducted, this research measures board IT governance using actual directors’
behaviors and actions in IT strategic decision making and oversight of IT. By using objective criteria
for measuring board involvement, this model examines what is happening at the board level, rather
than relying exclusively on proxy variables (e.g., board size or proportion of insiders) as indicators
of what might or could be happening. As can be seen in Appendix B, the EFA extracted one factor
for board IT governance.

10.4. IT Competency
Although we found no measures of IT competency in the context of board IT governance in the
literature, there are several measures that provided a starting point. Basellier et al. (2003) developed
IT expertise scales for business managers, and we used these IT expertise scales as a basis for the
measure of IT expertise of directors in this research. IT governance research has also pointed to the
presence of IT governance mechanisms such as structures, processes, and relational mechanisms
as imperative to the proper governance of IT. Most of this research has focused at the managerial
level; however, several studies have also been conducted at the board level (e.g., Boritz & Lim, 2007;
De Haes & Van Grembergen, 2005). We added to and modified the IT expertise and IT governance
mechanisms measures in the literature to ensure that all measures were appropriate for the board of
directors in the context of providing IT governance.
Using EFA, we made iterative modifications to the items to measure IT expertise. Any items that did
not have strong convergent and discriminate validity were deleted from the EFA until satisfactory
levels were reached. The final three-factor model – internal knowledge, external information, and
9
experience and training – is presented in Appendix B .
Using EFA, we also made iterative modifications to the items to measure the level of IT governance
mechanisms present on the board. As with the IT expertise construct, we deleted from the EFA any
items that did not have strong convergent and discriminate validity for the IT governance mechanisms
construct until satisfactory levels were reached. The final two-factor model – internal activities and
10
external activities – is presented in Appendix B .

10.5. Role of IT
EFA of the role of IT revealed factors that are consistent with those proposed by Raghunathan et al.
(1999) (Appendix B). Just as in Raghunathan et al. (1999), we found that the items comprising the
operational reliance on IT capture the importance of the organization’s current systems to the
achievement of its current operations. Additionally, the three factors – managerial support,
differentiation, and enhancement – comprising the strategic reliance on IT represent three ways that
new IT can have a future role in an organization.

10.6. IT Contribution to Firm Performance
Since many of the respondents are from non-public organizations, this research uses primary
(subjective) sources of operational performance data. The operational performance measure used in
this research is a self-report of the degree to which IT contributes to seven operational performance
measures that Preston et al. (2008) derived in previous research. The two-factor measure represents
two dimensions of IT contribution to firm performance. The first factor captures the external
performance metrics, and the second factor captures the internal performance metrics (Appendix B).
9

10

The first factor, internal knowledge, captures the extent to which board members are knowledgeable about IT policies,
performance, budget, or other information within the organization. The second factor, external information, focuses on the extent
to which board members are knowledgeable about information outside of the organization or technology, in general. The third
factor, experience and training, consists of the extent of experience and training of directors on the board.
The first factor, internal activities, captures the structures, processes, and relational mechanisms that involve activities that include
the consideration of IT inside the boardroom. The second factor, external activities, refers to the processes that occur outside of
the boardroom.
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11. Data Analysis
Table 4 shows that five of the propositions were supported, one proposition was not supported, and
11
one proposition had a contradictory finding .
Table 4. Summary of Survey Findings
Proposition

Antecedents to IT
Governance

Consequences of
IT Governance

Findings and
Direction

Conclusion

1

Proportion of Insiders → Board IT Governance

** (negative)

contradictory

2

Board Size → Board IT Governance

* (negative)

supported

3

IT Competency → Board IT Governance

** to *** (positive)

supported

4

Organization Size → Board IT Governance

not significant

not supported

5

Organization Age → Board IT Governance

** (negative)

supported

6

Overall Role of IT → Board IT Governance

* to *** (positive)

supported

7

Board IT Governance → Contribution of IT to
Firm performance

*** (positive)

supported

Note: + p < .1, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001

Table 5 provides the Pearson bivariate correlations for the antecedents and consequences of IT
governance. Board IT governance demonstrated bivariate correlation with all of the independent
variables except for proportion of insiders and number of directors, indicating that these constructs
appear to be important in understanding board involvement in IT governance.
Table 5. Correlation Matrix
Insid
NoDir

NoDir

ExpF1 ExpF2 ExpF3 MecF1 MecF2 OrelF1 SrelF1 SrelF2 SrelF3 Perf

-.435**

ExpF1

.021

-.068

ExpF2

-.011

.011

ExpF3

-.105

.256**

-.004

.044

MecF1

-.223*

.132

.611**

.127

MecF2

.104

.032

.325**

.210*

.103

-.008

OrelF

-.120

.084

.260**

-.137

-.071

.202*

.073

SrelF1

.026

.031

.220**

.006

-.157

.151

.267**

.284**

SrelF2

-.117

.059

.354**

.160

.244**

.359**

.150

.348**

-.004

SrelF3

-.081

.060

.229**

.016

-.061

.293**

-.067

.409**

.001

-.002

.410**

.210*

.485**

.086

-.163

.009

.641**

.293**

.239**

.577**

.422**

.190*

.307**

.326**

.182*

.014
.270**

Perf
ITG

.447**

Legend: Insid = Proportion of Inside Directors, NoDir = Number of Directors, ExpF1 = IT Expertise Factor 1, ExpF2 = IT
Expertise Factor 2, ExpF3 = IT Expertise Factor 3, MecF1 = IT Mechanisms Factor 1, MecF2 = IT Mechanisms Factor 2, OrelF
= Operational Reliance on IT Factor, SrelF1 = Strategic Reliance on IT Factor 1, SrelF2 = Strategic Reliance on IT Factor 2,
SrelF3 = Strategic Reliance on IT Factor 3, Perf = Contribution of IT to Performance, ITG = IT Governance.
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

We used ordinary least squares hierarchical multiple regression to analyze the antecedents and
consequences of board IT governance. We performed regression diagnostics to assess the model’s
adherence to the regression assumptions and to identify any data problems. The analysis showed
11
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Regression diagnostics were performed to assess the model’s adherence to the regression assumptions and to identify any data
problems. The analysis showed that the model supported the assumptions that underlie multiple regression such as linearity,
independence of errors, homoscedasticity, and normality of residuals. Furthermore, the analysis of the data problems focusing on
the distance, leverage, and influence indicated that there were no problems present.
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that the model supported the assumptions that underlie multiple regression such as linearity,
independence of errors, homoscedasticity, and normality of residuals. Furthermore, the analysis of
the data problems focusing on the distance, leverage, and influence indicated that there were no
problems present. Table 6 shows the model summary at each step in the hierarchical regression of
board involvement in IT governance on organization factors and board attributes.
Table 6. Regression – Antecedents to Board IT Governance
Propositions 4, 5
and 6

Propositions 1, 2
and 3

.109 (.245)

.498 (.412)

-.268 (.315)

-.286 (.223)

-.467 (.291)

-.408+ (.205)

-.152 (.293)

-.091 (.208)

.307+ (.181)

.167 (.137)

-.119 (.109)

-.002 (.079)

Strategic Reliance on IT – Factor 1 – Managerial Support

.335*** (.093)

.170* (.070)

Strategic Reliance on IT – Factor 2 - Differentiation

.380*** (.093)

-.003 (.076)

Strategic Reliance on IT – Factor 3 - Enhancement

.221* (.096)

.042 (.072)

Variables

Board Attributes

Organization Factors

Intercept
Organization Size - Small

a

Organization Size – Medium

a

a

Organization Size -Large

Organization Age – 20 years or less

b

Operational Reliance on IT

Proportion of Insiders

-.573** (.194)

Board Size

-.785* (.369)

IT Expertise Factor 1 – Internal Knowledge

.435*** (.095)

IT Expertise Factor 2 – External Knowledge

.210** (.065)

IT Expertise Factor 3 – Experience and Training

.218** (.072)

IT Governance Mechanisms Factor 1 – Internal Activities

.146 (.098)

IT Governance Mechanisms Factor 2 – External Activities

.185** (.074)

Step 1
F Value

4.962***

Model R-Square

.284***

Adjusted R-Square

.227***

Step 2
F Value

13.049***

Model R-Square

.678***

Adjusted R-Square

.626***

Change in R-Square

.394***

Coefficients listed are unstandardized betas. Standard errors are in parenthesis.
+ p < .1, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001
a
Dummy variable for organization size with “small” composed of those organizations with less than or equal to 100 employees,
“medium” composed of those with 101-500 employees, “large” composed of those with 501-5000 employees, and the
contrast group is those with 5001 or greater employees.
b
Dummy variable for organization age with 0 = formed more than 20 years ago, 1 = formed 20 years ago or less.

The first set of variables entered in the hierarchical regression, the organization factors, resulted in a
statistically significant, explanation of variance ( = 0.284, p < 0.001). The second set of variables
entered into the regression equation, board factors, explained a statistically significant increase in the
board involvement in IT governance ( = 0.394, p < 0.001), for a total explained variance of = 0.678, p
< 0.001. This indicates that organization factors are insufficient in explaining board involvement in IT
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governance – explaining only 28.4 percent of the variance in board IT governance involvement – and
that by also including board attributes, approximately 68 percent of the variance is explained.
As proposed, we found a significant negative relationship at the .05 level between board size and
board IT governance (Proposition 2), and a significant positive relationship at the .01 to the .001
12
levels between IT competency and board IT governance (Proposition 3) . However, a higher
proportion of insiders on the board did not result in a significant positive effect on board IT
governance (Proposition 1). Instead the opposite effect was found – the lower the proportion of
insiders on the board, the more likely the board would be involved in IT governance, which
contradicts Proposition 1.
With respect to the organization factors, organization size was not a significant predictor of board IT
governance (Proposition 4). However, the rest of the propositions with respect to the relationship
between organization factors and IT governance were supported. We found age to be significantly and
negatively related to board IT governance at the .01 level (Proposition 5), and we found a significant
positive relationship at the .05 to .001 levels between overall role of IT in the organization and overall IT
13
governance involvement (Proposition 8) . Table 7 shows the model summary at each step in the
hierarchical regression of IT contribution to firm performance on board involvement in IT governance.
Table 7. Regression – Consequences of Board IT Governance
Variables
Intercept
Ownership

a

Organization Size - Small

b

Organization Size – Medium

b

b

Organization Size - Large

Organization Age – 20 years or less

c

Proposition 7 – Model 1

Proposition 7 – Model 2

.197 (0.424)

-.075 (.385)

.567+ (0.325)

.423 (.294)

-.687 (0.626)

-.192 (.573)

-.490 (0.569)

.035 (.524)

-.948 (0.547)

-.587 (.497)

.294 (0.366)

.155 (.330)

IT Governance

.337*** (.073)

F Value

1.104

21.004***

Model R-Square

.062

.251***

Adjusted R-Square

.006

.197***

Change in R-Square

.190***

Coefficients listed are unstandardized betas. Standard errors are in parenthesis.
+ p < .1, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001
a
Dummy variable for ownership with 0 = publicly traded, 1 = privately held.
b
Dummy variable for organization size with “small” composed of those organizations with less than or equal to 100 employees,
“medium” composed of those with 101-500 employees, “large” composed of those with 501-5000 employees, and the contrast
group is those with 5001 or greater employees.
c
Dummy variable for organization age with 0 = formed more than 20 years ago, 1 = formed 20 years ago or less.

Model 1 presents the control variables for the regression, and Model 2 adds the independent
variable, IT governance, representing the full model. The control variables entered in the first step
of the hierarchical regression (Model 1) did not result in statistically significant explanation of
variance. However, the board IT governance variable entered in the second step of the regression
12

13
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The coefficients of the IT competency constructs show that all but one of the coefficients is significantly and positively related to
board IT governance (Table 6). The internal knowledge, external knowledge, experience and training, and external activities
factors are significant at the 0.001, 0.01, 0.01, and 0.01 levels, respectively. The IT governance mechanisms internal activities
factor is not significant; however, removing this factor from the regression reduces the overall R2; therefore, this variable is kept in
the model.
The operational reliance on IT factor is not statistically significant; however, the managerial support, differentiation, and
enhancement factors for the strategic reliance on IT are significant at the 0.001, 0.001, and 0.05 levels, respectively (Table 6).
Removing the operational reliance on IT factor from the regression reduces the overall R2; therefore, this factor is kept in the
model, and Proposition 8 is accepted.
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equation (Model 2) explained a statistically significant increase in IT contribution to firm
performance (= 0.190, p < 0.001). Therefore, board IT governance explains 19 percent more
variance of IT contribution to firm performance. The regression coefficient of board IT governance
shows that it is significant and positively related to contribution of IT to firm performance at the
0.001 level. Therefore, Proposition 7 is accepted.

12. Discussion
Both the exercise of strategic choice and institutional forces appear to impact the antecedents and
consequences of board IT governance.
In the first premise of our theoretical model, we used strategic choice theory to propose relationships
between board attributes and board IT governance. Although prior research has not applied this
theory to board involvement in IT governance, it appears that it may be an appropriate theoretical
lens through which to examine the impact of board attributes on IT governance since the data
analysis suggests that a board’s composition may influence its involvement in IT governance.
However, not all propositions were supported.
Contrary to Proposition 1, a negative relationship was found between the proportion of insiders and
board IT governance. As we previously discussed, the relationship between insiders and board
involvement in corporate governance has also yielded mixed results in previous studies. To
examine the relationship between the proportion of insiders and board IT governance further, we
investigated two alternate arguments.
First, it has been argued that boards rely on outside directors to reduce agency costs associated with
monitoring managerial decision making and performance, whereas inside directors are relied on as
the main source of advice on strategic issues (Baysinger & Butler, 1985). To investigate whether this
argument holds and whether it might help explain the negative relationship found between proportion
of insiders and overall board IT governance, we analyzed the relationship between insiders and two
types of board IT governance activities that were introduced by Nolan and McFarlan (2005) – (1)
defensive activities involving the monitoring of management and (2) offensive activities involving the
provision of advice. According to Baysinger and Butler’s argument (1985), there should be a negative
relationship between inside directors and defensive IT governance (monitoring managerial decision
making) and a positive relationship between inside directors and offensive IT governance (providing
advice to management). However, we found that insiders were significantly and negatively related to
both defensive (= 0.025, p < 0.1, the regression coefficient for proportion of insiders was significant
and negatively related at the 0.1 level) and offensive IT governance (= 0.029, p < 0.05, the regression
coefficient for proportion of insiders was significant and negatively related at the 0.05 level) (refer to
Appendix C – Analysis 1). Therefore, Baysinger and Butler’s argument (1985) does not appear to
help explain the contradictory finding of Proposition 1.
Second, we proposed an alternate argument that boards with a larger proportion of insiders may have
more knowledge of IT management and have more comfort in IT management and, thus, do not feel
as much of a need to be involved in IT governance as would boards with a smaller proportion of
insiders. To examine this argument, we regressed board IT governance on proportion of insiders and
various measures of level of comfort the board has in IT management. We added a cross-product
term (Proportion of Insiders X Level of Comfort Measure) to the model to test the possible interaction
between proportion of insiders and level of comfort (low and high levels for four types of comfort –
competency, integrity, transparency, and reliability) and their effects on board IT governance. The
regressions resulted in statistically significant explanations of variance; however, the interaction terms
were not statistically significant (refer to Appendix C – Analysis 2). This suggests that the proportion
of insiders has the same effect on board IT governance for both low and high levels of comfort in IT
management. Thus, the reasons for the negative relationship between proportion of insiders and
board IT governance are not clear, and future work is needed in this area. It may be that, as is
suggested in much empirical and theoretical research (see Hermalin & Weisbach, 2003), a higher
proportion of insiders may diminish the effectiveness of governance.
Our analysis of the survey data confirmed the proposed negative relationship between board size and
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board IT governance (Proposition 2). As proposed using strategic choice theory, it may be that the
level of board involvement increases as the size of the board decreases because the smaller board
size enhances the ability of the board to work together and contribute to deliberations. Given that this
is the only study examining this relationship, the survey results are compelling evidence for the
negative effect of board size on IT governance; however, further research is needed.
The strong support for the positive relationship between IT competency (IT expertise and IT
governance mechanisms) and board IT governance is important because it offers the first empirical
support for this relationship. This finding confirms the conceptual IT governance literature on the
importance of directors’ IT competency for board IT governance (e.g., Burson-Marsteller, 2005; Huff
et al., 2006; Jordan & Musson, 2004; IT Governance Institute, 2003; Nolan & McFarlan, 2005). The
strong statistical significance of this relationship in the survey data suggests the importance of
directors’ IT competency in contributing to their involvement in IT governance. These findings support
Proposition 3, which, based on strategic choice theory, proposed that competence may push back
limits on the exercise of choice by decision-makers and, thus, encourage board IT governance.
Therefore, the argument that structures, processes, and relational mechanisms enable decisionmakers to access relevant information in a timely fashion, and that expertise enables decision-makers
to deal with the information when making strategic choices is supported.
In the second premise of our theoretical model, we used institutional theory to propose relationships
between organization factors and board IT governance. The proposed negative relationship between
organization size and board IT governance was not supported in the survey data; however the
interview data seemed to suggest that the negative relationship does exist (Proposition 4). Mixed
results have also been reported in the literature. The relationship between organization size and
corporate governance was examined by Baack (2000) in a study in which she found a positive
relationship existed. However, the level of differentiation in an organization (we used organization
size as a proxy for level of differentiation) was found to be negatively related to corporate governance
(Judge & Zeithaml, 1992). The mixed findings of the interviews and survey in this research and the
conflicting findings from the literature with respect to board involvement in corporate governance
indicate that future research is needed to investigate this relationship further.
The analysis of the relationship between organization age and board IT governance yielded
interesting insights. As proposed, the survey data revealed that boards of younger organizations
(20 years or younger) were more likely be involved in IT governance than boards of older
organizations (Proposition 5). This is in line with prior literature that has used institutional theory to
suggest that organizational processes reflect the practices at the time of founding because the
organization adopts the predominant practices in that time and because organizational processes
are resistant to change (e.g., Eisenhardt, 1988; Stinchcombe, 1965; Tolbert & Zucker, 1983). This
research offers early, if not the first, evidence that, as suggested in the normative literature, the
greater an organization’s reliance on IT, the greater a board’s IT governance (IT Governance
Institute, 2003; Nolan & McFarlan, 2005) (Proposition 6).
Finally, for our third premise, we proposed that the extent to which IT contributes to firm performance
is a function of the level of board involvement in IT governance. We found a significant and positive
relationship between board IT governance and the contribution of IT to organizational performance
(Proposition 7). In fact, board IT governance explained 19 percent of the variance in the contribution
of IT to organizational performance. To our knowledge this is the first research that directly examined
the performance consequences of board IT governance.
In addition to examination of the premises of our theoretical model, the responses to survey questions
revealed another interesting result. Much of the IT governance research has recommended the use of
board-level IT Strategy Committees to aid decision making (e.g., IT Governance Institute, 2003;
Nolan & McFarlan, 2005; Peterson, 2003); however, as other studies have found (e.g., De Haes &
Van Grembergen, 2005; Ernst & Young, 2006; Huff et al., 2006), we also found that most boards do
not have such committees – 91 percent of the respondents to our survey indicated that his/her board
did not have such a committee.
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In fact, during our interviews, some of the directors were strongly opposed to an IT strategy
committee, and they commented:
Do you have a marketing committee of the board, do you have a commercial banking
committee, no – you’d have 100 committees.
No. Boards avoid more committees… [there] used to be lots of committees, most of us
are spending our time shrinking such committees, as opposed to creating another
category.
We do strategy sessions at the board level and the CTO is part of those strategy
sessions, but no specific committee. And it wasn’t really a consideration. Who has time?
It’s a huge problem.
Future research could investigate the role of such committees, as there is limited understanding of
how or when IT Strategy Committees are effectively incorporated in board decision-making. For
example, a field study of a Belgian financial group found that even though the company had an IT
Strategy Committee it “did not enable a more thorough and ongoing involvement of boards in IT
governance” (De Haes & Van Grembergen, 2005, p. 5).

12.1. Contributions
This research has several contributions to theory and to boards’ practice of IT governance. The
theoretical model is characterized as more exploratory than confirmatory and can be viewed as an
early step toward understanding antecedents and consequences of IT governance. This somewhat
limits the explanatory ability, thus, while not offering a prescriptive solution for all boards, this
research will help identify key antecedents and consequences that may be applicable in selected
settings. We discuss the implications for research and practice in turn.

12.2. Implications for Research
First, this research contributes to theory by responding to the recognized need for more research on
board IT governance.
Second, this research contributes by developing and testing a multi-theoretic model of the
antecedents and consequences of IT governance. From a theoretical perspective, the extant
literature does not adequately describe and explain why some boards are involved in IT governance
or whether firms with board IT governance have superior firm performance. Using strategic choice
theory and institutional theory to study antecedents to actual board governance of IT and its
consequences, this research was able to investigate these questions. Strategic choice and
institutional theories appear to offer complementary views of why boards decide to become involved
in the governance of IT. Board and organizational antecedents as strategic adaptations or institutional
responses to IT governance needs are explored. Use of the two theories allowed the inclusion of
antecedents to board IT governance, which have not been investigated in prior research and,
therefore, offer a richer view of such governance. The survey’s results showed that organizational
factors explain 28.4 percent of the variance in board IT governance, and that board attributes explain
39.4 percent more of the variance, for a total explained variance in board IT governance of
approximately 68 percent. Therefore, as proposed, each theory gives only a limited explanation of the
whole phenomenon regarding the antecedents to board IT governance. Taken together,
organizational factors and board attributes provide a richer, more complex view of the antecedents to
IT governance. This may encourage researchers of board IT governance to explore the impact of
organizational factors in addition to role of IT on board IT governance, and to continue to explore the
impact of board attributes on board IT governance. In addition, the results of the survey suggest a
relationship contrary to the one proposed for proportion of insiders and board IT governance. The
negative relationship found suggests that a theory other than strategic choice may be applicable.
Examination of the consequences of board IT governance using strategic choice theory through the
survey confirmed the positive impact of board IT governance on the contribution of IT to
organizational performance, explaining 19 percent of the variance.
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The third theoretical contribution is the empirical assessment of the antecedents and consequences
of board IT governance. As discussed, the survey results offer support for many of the antecedents
and consequences of board IT governance proposed in prior literature and in the theoretical model of
this research. Additionally, this research makes a contribution by being possibly the first to empirically
examine the application in practice of Nolan and McFarlan’s (2005) IT strategic impact grid.
Finally, we feel that our examination of board IT governance and board-level IT competency has
responded, in part, to the call for board researchers to “go beyond structuralism and to examine
board processes, board behavior, and directors’ cognition….in order to improve our understanding of
the board of directors’ contribution to strategy” (Pugliese et al., 2009, p. 301). In a review of research
on the relationship between boards of directors and strategy from 1972 to 2007, Pugliese et al. (2009)
find that board research is evolving from normative and structural approaches to behavioral and
cognitive approaches. For example, Useem and Zelleke (2006) and Finkelstein and Mooney (2003)
conducted interviews with directors to study board processes.
Similarly, in our study, building upon prior research and guided by the interviews we conducted, we
measured board IT governance using actual directors’ behaviors and actions in IT strategic
decision making and oversight of IT, we also measured IT competency of directors using the survey
respondents’ assessment of the IT expertise of the directors on the board and their use of IT
governance mechanisms. By using objective criteria for measuring board involvement, we examine
what is happening at the board level and the IT competency of directors, rather than relying
exclusively on proxy variables (e.g., board size or proportion of insiders) as indicators of what might
or could be happening. This is a first step toward opening the black box of board-level IT
governance research. With our measure of board IT governance, we have enriched the
understanding of how boards govern IT by identifying distinct dimensions of board involvement in
IT governance. Similarly, with our measure of IT competency, we identified types of IT expertise
and specific IT governance mechanisms through which IT governance can be enacted at the board
level. IT governance mechanisms include structure, processes, and relational mechanisms such
as: Including IT as an item on the agenda of the board; interaction of the board with senior IT
management, and communication between board members and IT management (including CIO)
between scheduled meetings. With a better understanding of board-level IT governance and IT
competency and the development of measures for these constructs, further investigation of these
measures and their impacts is now possible. We would like to further develop a behavioral and
cognitive approach to study the contribution of boards to IT governance through a longitudinal
study to explore the board processes and through collecting primary data using interviews, surveys,
and direct observation techniques.

12.3. Implications for Practice
Directors should be reminded that, as with corporate governance, boards have a fiduciary duty and a
duty of care in IT governance, they are responsible for acting honestly and in good faith and for
spending time to make informed business judgments. Directors need to stop ignoring IT and start
paying more attention to developing leadership and organizational structures and processes that
ensure that the organization’s IT sustains and extends the organization’s strategies and objectives.
Perhaps the greatest motivation for board involvement in IT governance is the significant positive
relationship that board IT governance was found to have with the contribution of IT to
organizational performance for the survey respondents. This is especially noteworthy given that
there appears to be much room for improvement in board IT governance, with, on average, the
survey respondents rating their boards’ overall IT governance effectiveness at 53 percent (an
average of 2.6 on a 5-point scale). Therefore, directors should mindfully examine their board’s IT
governance to assess if their level of involvement is appropriate and if it enables a greater
contribution of IT to their organization’s performance.
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Directors may find it useful to ask themselves the degree to which :
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

IT is an item on the agenda of the board
The board encourages the inclusion of IT on the meeting agenda
The board works well with senior IT management
Some board members and IT management (including CIO) communicate between scheduled
meetings
The recruitment of board members includes consideration of IT expertise
The board gets independent assurance on the containment of IT risks
The board gets independent assurance on the achievement of IT objectives
There are regular sessions for outside directors to discuss IT.

Our survey results suggest that the level of IT governance practiced by a board is a factor of both board
characteristics (and a function of rational choice) and organizational characteristics (and a function of
institutional pressures). Thus, board IT governance is not only a function of rational choice by directors,
but it is also influenced by institutional pressures. Directors, thus, need to be more sensitive to the
characteristics of their board and of their organization because these characteristics may be influencing
the mode of their board’s IT governance. For example, the significant relationship between board
characteristics (i.e., board size and IT competency) and IT governance may encourage boards to
manipulate factors that are under their control in an attempt to increase their involvement in IT
governance, while being cognizant of the organizational characteristics (i.e., organization age and role
of IT) that may be influencing the board’s governance of IT. Directors could reevaluate the size of their
board to assses whether it is impeding debate and discussion. Furthermore, the identification of director
IT competencies as antecedents of board IT governance may encourage boards to recruit directors with
formal IT training (42 percent of the survey respondents had no directors with formal IT training) or to
enlist their board in IT governance training programs (86 percent of the survey respondents identified
their board as not having received IT governance training).

12.4. Limitations
There are some limitations in this exploratory research that should be mentioned. First, the relatively
small sample and the inclusion of only members of the ICD in the sample limit the capacity to
generalize the research findings. However, demographics of the respondents suggested that
organizations from a variety of industries and ownership types were represented, and that the
directors held a variety of positions on their boards. In addition, one-way analysis of variance
(ANOVA) tests indicate that no statistically significant differences in the level of board IT
governance exist in the responses of board members representing different ownership types of
organizations. In other words, level of board IT governance practiced by a board does not differ by
15
ownership type of organization .
The second limitation is the possible response bias due to the fact that the survey relies on a single
respondent. To assess validity and reliability, it would have been preferable to obtain multiple
respondents per board. However, given the difficulty of obtaining responses to surveys in field
research, and particularly with respect to board members, this was accepted as a limitation.
The third limitation is the potential for bias in the data due to self-reporting. It would have been helpful
to have correlated the self-report, especially the self-report of the contribution of IT to organizational
performance, with objective performance measures gathered from an independent source. However,
it was not possible to use performance measures from secondary sources in this research because a
large portion of the responding organizations were not publicly traded and, therefore, financial
information was not publicly available. Subjective measures of performance have been used in
previous research, and results similar to objective measures have been found.

14
15

Items for the IT governance construct developed for this survey using EFA and shown in Appendix B.
There was no statistically significant difference between boards of organizations of different ownership types as determined by
one-way ANOVA (F(3,159) = 1.798, p = .150). A Tukey post-hoc test revealed that there were no statistically significant
differences in terms of board IT governance between the different ownership types of organizations.
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The final limitation in this research is its cross-sectional versus longitudinal nature. In particular, a
longitudinal study of the effects of board IT governance on firm performance would have provided more
information and may have enabled a more accurate portrayal of the performance consequences.

13. Conclusion
In this paper, we proposed a theoretical model based on strategic choice and institutional theories to
understand the antecedents and consequences of board IT governance. Based on the theoretical
model, we conducted interviews and a survey of corporate directors. The results indicate that some
board attributes and organizational factors influence board involvement in IT governance, and that a
contribution of IT to organizational performance appears to be positively influenced by increased
involvement of boards in IT governance.
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Appendices
Appendix A.
Table A-1. Industry Composition of Survey Respondents
Industry

Number Percent

Industry

Number Percent

Advanced technology

12

6.4

Healthcare provider /
Managed care

10

5.3

Agriculture

2

1.1

Industrial / Agricultural
equipment

3

1.6

Bank and Savings institutions

10

5.3

Insurance

13

6.9

Chemicals

3

1.6

Metals and Metal products

8

4.3

Construction services and
building materials

3

1.6

Non-profit

5

2.7

Consumer products

2

1.1

Other

8

4.3

Crown Corporation

4

2.1

Other financial institutions

14

7.4

E-commerce

4

2.1

Other healthcare

4

2.1

Education

2

1.1

Other manufacturing

4

2.1

Electronics/Electrical
equipment

2

1.1

Other service company

19

10.1

Energy/Utilities

21

11.2

Professional services

10

5.3

Entertainment/Hospitality

5

2.7

Publishing

1

.5

Forest and Paper products

1

.5

Retail

3

1.6

Healthcare
product/Pharmaceuticals

7

3.7

Transportation/Distribution

8

4.3

Total: 188

Table A-2. Ownership of the Organizations
Number

Percent

Ownership
Government

25

13.3

Non-profit

52

27.7

Privately held

58

30.9

Publicly traded

52

27.7

Total

188

100
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Table A-3. Respondents’ Board and IT Experience
Number

Percent

Number of Years on the Board
Less than 2 years

40

21.6

More than 2 years

145

78.4

Total

185

100

Number of Years in an IT Role
None

113

60.4

Less than 2 years

12

6.4

2 - 10 years

19

10.2

More than 10 years

43

23

Total
Number of Years of General Management of IT Experience

609

None

84

44.7

Less than 2 years

7

3.7

2 - 10 years

37

19.7

More than 10 years

60

31.9

Total

188

100
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Appendix B.
Table B-1. Survey Questions for Measured Variables
Variable
Proportion of Insiders - the
number of insiders divided
by the total number of
directors on the board.

Survey Question
(i) How many directors are on the board?
(ii) How many outside directors are on the board? (Outside directors
are those members on the board who are not employed as part of the
organization’s management team, their subordinates, relatives, or
managers of the organization’s subsidiaries. Also these directors are
not members of the organization’s immediate past management team.)

Board size - the total number
How many directors are on the board?
of directors.
Organization size - the
number of employees in the
organization.

Approximately how many employees does the organization have?
Less than 50, 51 – 100, 101 – 500, 501 – 1000, 1001 – 5000, 5000 –
10000, More than 10000

List of items for each construct resulting from exploratory factor analysis (EFA):
1. Board IT Governance
2. IT Expertise
3. IT Governance Mechanisms
4. Role of IT
5. Contribution of IT to Organizational Performance.
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1. Board IT Governance
Table B-2. EFA of Board IT Governance
Analysis 1: Level of Overall Involvement in IT Governance
Maximum Likelihood Solution (One Factor Extracted)
Overall IT Governance
Eigenvalue:

8.058

Variance Explained:

57.554%

Cronbach’s Alpha:

0.943

IT project governance/management methodologies

a

0.827

Training and development to ensure the needs are fully identified and
a
addressed for all staff
Compliance with the agreed organizational risk profile of IT

a

0.804

Workforce planning and investment to ensure recruitment and retention
a
of skilled IT staff

0.796

Monitors that IT delivers against the strategy through clear
b
expectations and measurement

0.787

Performs IT governance assurance and self-assessment

b

Organization’s progress or performance toward better IT governance

0.779
a

0.772

Compliance with IT to laws, regulations, industry standards and
a
contractual commitments

0.764

Identifies possible IT threats and opportunities critical to the future of
b
the organization

0.756

Shapes the business/IT strategic alignment

b

0.740

Stakeholders' satisfaction with IT (e.g. measured through a survey
a
and/or number of complaints)
Contribution from IT to a competitive advantage
Advises during major IT decisions

b

IT risks to which the organization is exposed
a

b

611

0.806

a

0.706
0.703
0.702

a

0.656

Indicates the extent to which the board monitors the following issues or activities. (Scale 1: Not at all - 4: To a large extent,
N/A)
Indicates the extent to which the board is involved in the following activities. (Scale 1: Not at all - 4: To a large extent, N/A)
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2. IT Expertise
Table B-3. EFA of Level of IT Expertise
Analysis 1: Level of IT Expertise on the Board
Maximum Likelihood Solution / Varimax Rotation
Factor 1
Internal
Knowledge

Factor 2
External
Information

Factor 3
Experience
and Training

Eigenvalue:

8.417

1.957

1.374

Variance Explained:

46.760

10.872

7.632

0.914

0.885

0.840

.801

.270

.081

.791

.358

.092

.789

.251

.092

.788

.056

.049

.782

.281

.195

.775

.285

.190

Existing IT used in the organization

.637

.366

.151

IT or business people to contact within the organization as
a
sources of information about IT

.551

.344

.190

Indicate the degree to which information from management
about the organization's IT operations and management
b
practices is sufficient

.537

.107

.200

Secondary sources of knowledge as source of information about
b
IT

.277

.810

.210

Applications in general (i.e., internet, electronic data interchange,
a
e-commerce, Groupware)

.244

.797

.130

IT or business people to contact outside of the organization as
a
sources of information about IT

.213

.789

.181

Technology in general (i.e., personal computer, client-server,
a
LAN, imagery technology, multimedia technology)

.282

.721

.038

Systems development in general (i.e., traditional systems
development life cycle, end-use computing, prototyping,
a
outsourcing, project management practices)

.224

.640

.333

Other directors to contact as sources of information about IT

.309

.567

.333

How many directors have worked directly in an IT role within an
organization or as a consultant or academic (e.g. in areas such
as IT development, IT implementation, participation or leadership
c
in new IT projects, management of IT projects)?

.142

.173

.885

How many directors have received formal training in IT (i.e.
c
certificates, diplomas, undergraduate or graduate degrees)?

.111

.188

.837

How many directors have experience in the general
management of IT within an organization or as a consultant or
academic (e.g. in areas such as participation in the creation of
c
an IT vision statement, IT strategy, IT policies, or IT budgets)?

.237

.244

.743

Cronbach’s Alpha:
IT policies in the organization

a

a

Performance of IT

IT risks to which the organization is exposed
Overall IT budget of the organization

a

a

Overall IT strategy/vision of the organization

a
a

IT resources (people, systems, financials) in the organization
a

a

a

The extent to which the board members are knowledgeable about…(Scale 1: Not knowledgeable – 5: Very knowledgeable)
Scale 1: Not knowledgeable - 5: Very knowledgeable
c
Scale None, 1 director, 2-5 directors, more than 5 directors, don’t know
b
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3. IT Governance Mechanisms
Table B-4. EFA of Governance Mechanisms
Analysis 1: Level of IT Governance Mechanisms Presence on the Board
Maximum Likelihood Solution / Varimax Rotation
Factor 2
Factor 1
Internal Activities External Activities
Eigenvalue:

4.283

1.176

Variance Explained:

53.536

14.694

Cronbach’s Alpha:

0.846

0.828

0.870

0.134

0.855

0.239

0.753

0.213

Some board members and IT management (including CIO)
b
communicate between scheduled meetings

0.672

0.216

The recruitment of board members includes consideration
c
of IT expertise

0.582

0.374

The board gets independent assurance on the containment
a
of IT risks

0.144

0.910

The board gets independent assurance on the achievement
a
of IT objectives

0.254

0.899

There are regular sessions for outside directors to discuss
a
IT

0.486

0.591

IT is an item on the agenda of the board

a

The board encourages the inclusion of IT on the meeting
a
agenda
The board works well with senior IT management

b

a

Indicates the degree to which the following items describe the board's processes. Where 1 is "Not at all", 2 is "Not really", 3 is
"To some extent", and 4 is "To a large extent".
b
Indicates the degree to which the following items describe the board's relationship and communication with management.
Where 1 is "Not at all", 2 is "Not really", 3 is "To some extent", and 4 is "To a large extent".
c
Indicates the degree to which the following items describe the board/management structure. Where 1 is "Not at all", 2 is "Not
really", 3 is "To some extent", and 4 is "To a large extent".
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4. Role of IT
Table B-5. EFA of Role of IT
Analysis 1: Operational Reliance on IT in the Organization
Maximum Likelihood Solution (One Factor Extracted)
Factor 1
Eigenvalue:

4.258

Variance Explained:

70.973%

Cronbach’s Alpha:

0.917

Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the following statements as they relate to the
existing IT in the organization, where 1 is “disagree strongly” and 5 is “agree strongly”.
IT breakdown will critically affect one or more of our functional departments

0.890

Organization relies heavily on IT for efficient operation

0.875

IT is vital to our organization

0.864

IT breakdown for extended periods will affect organizational activities severely

0.863

IT breakdown will affect our database access

0.796

IT breakdown will affect overall coordination within our organization

0.758

Table B-6. EFA of Role of IT
Analysis 2: Strategic Reliance on IT in the Organization
Maximum Likelihood Solution / Varimax Rotation
Factor 1
Managerial
Support
Eigenvalue:
Variance Explained:
Cronbach’s Alpha:

Factor 2
Differentiation

Factor 3
Enhancement

4.227

1.24

1.033

46.965%

13.782%

11.482%

0.841

0.785

0.692

Please indicate the significance of the following items as components of your portfolio of planned IT projects,
where 1 is “very unimportant” and 5 is “very important”:
Projects whose primary benefit is providing new decision
support information to top management

0.850

0.175

0.165

Projects whose primary benefit is providing new decision
support information to middle and lower levels of
management

0.837

0.149

0.055

Projects which enable development of new administrative
control and planning processes

0.728

0.221

0.248

Projects which offer significant tangible benefits through
improved operational efficiencies

0.601

0.328

0.450

Projects which will allow the organization to develop and offer
new products or services for sale

0.113

0.915

0.058

Projects which appear to offer new ways for the organization
to compete

0.235

0.861

0.112

Projects involving application of new technologies

0.312

0.576

0.291

Projects focusing on routine maintenance to meet evolving
business needs, new regulatory or legal requirements

0.069

0.154

0.861

Projects focusing on existing systems enhancements

0.307

0.083

0.798
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5. Contribution of IT to Organizational Performance
Table B-7. EFA of Contribution of IT to Organizational Performance
Analysis 1: Operational performance
Maximum Likelihood Solution / Varimax Rotation

Eigenvalue:
Variance Explained:
Cronbach’s Alpha:

Factor 1 External Performance

Factor 2 Internal Performance

4.389

1.101

62.705%

15.735%

0.882

0.880

Please assess the extent to which IT has contributed to the following seven areas of organizational
performance. Where 1 is "Contribution is minimal" and 5 is "IT has contributed to a very great extent".

615

Sales Revenue Increase

.943

.172

Market Share Increase

.917

.244

Customer Satisfaction

.676

.488

Return on Investment (ROI)

.655

.355

Process Improvement

.225

.892

Operating Efficiency

.244

.883

Cost Savings

.353

.783
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Appendix C.
Table C-1. Supplemental Analysis 1 – Effects of Proportion of Insiders on Type of IT
Governance
Variables

Defensive IT Governance

Offensive IT Governance

-.442+ (.252)

-.475* (.238)

F Value

3.088+

4.001*

Model R-Square

.025+

.029*

Adjusted R-Square

.017+

.021*

Proportion of Insiders

Coefficients listed are unstandardized betas. Standard errors are in parenthesis.
+ p < .1, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001

Table C-2. Supplemental Analysis 2 – Effects of Proportion of Insiders and Level of Comfort
in IT Management on Board IT Governance
Level of Comfort –
Transparency

Level of Comfort –
Competency

Level of Comfort –
Integrity

Level of Comfort
– Reliability

Intercept

-.469 (.318)

-.666 (.426)

-.744+ (.397)

-.531 (.350)

High Level of
Transparency

.396 (.402)

Variables

High Level of
Competency

.624 (.516)

High Level of Integrity

.737 (.473)

High Level of Reliability

.508 (.431)

Proportion of Insiders

-.155 (.407)

Proportion of Insiders
and High Level of
Transparency
Interaction

-.362 (.555)

Proportion of Insiders
and High Level of
Competency Interaction

-.422 (.584)

-.472 (.575)

-.177 (.480)

-.001 (.742)

Proportion of Insiders
and High Level of
Integrity Interaction

.220 (.692)

Proportion of Insiders
and High Level of
Reliability Interaction

-.243 (.609)

F Value

5.754***

5.458**

4.440**

6.041***

Model R-Square

.127***

.121**

.101**

.132***

Adjusted R-Square

.105***

.099**

.078**

.110***

Coefficients listed are unstandardized betas. Standard errors are in parenthesis.
+ p < .1, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001
a
Dummy variable for level of transparency of IT management, composed of those responses with transparency rated 4 or 5 on
a five point scale.
b
Dummy variable for level of competency of IT management, composed of those responses with competency rated 4 or 5 on a
five point scale.
c
Dummy variable for level of integrity of IT management, composed of those responses with integrity rated 4 or 5 on a five
point scale.
d
Dummy variable for level of reliability of IT management, composed of those responses with reliability rated 4 or 5 on a five
point scale.
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